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Abstract  
In interpersonal value conflicts ethical principles are employed to justify own actions. 
However, there is competition among ethical principles. Therefore the preference for a 
specific ethical principle may be merely a function both of personal values and of the 
value-laden situations in which actions are made. A German sample of 132 participants 
rated their agreement on ten justifications in seven experimentally constructed situa-
tions. The situations varied in their expression of values, organized by the value circle 
(Schwartz, 1992). The justifications assess five ethical principles (deontology, utilitarianism, 
partiality, hedonism, and intuitionism). Variance components of the agreement ratings 
were separated using GLM and plotted in the value circle. Preferences for ethical prin-
ciples depended on both the value content of situations and the responder values. The 
Person x Situation interaction was not significant. The results illustrate the difficulties in 
gaining agreement on arguments among individuals with conflicting values.  
 
Keywords:  values, moral reasoning, person-situation interaction. 
 
 
People endorse different values that they consider to be important. These values 
can be in conflict with each other and accordingly people decide to give priority to 
some values over others (Schwartz, 1992, 2011). Research on people’s reasons for 
endorsing certain values shows that argumentative support in the sense of cognitive 
elaboration on sound principles and good causes can foster endorsement of values 
and increase the likelihood of behavior in accordance with these values (Bernard et 
al., 2003a). However, people do not always have argumentative support for their 
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values and are vulnerable to the attack of their values (Bernard et al., 2003b). There-
fore, in situations in which values are under discussion, argumentative support is cru-
cial (e.g., Cherry & Faedrich, 2002 in business ethics, Candee, 1984 in medical eth-
ics). In the philosophical tradition, philosophers conceptualize categories of reason-
ing which intend to establish a basis for agreement independent of certain value 
positions, i.e. so called ethical principles (Beck, 1989; Larmore, 1987). However, ethi-
cal principles as patterns of reasoning are rarely addressed by psychological re-
search (cf. Cherry & Fraedrich, 2002).  
 
Evidently, individuals justify their actions and value decisions using various methods 
of ethical reasoning (e.g. Maio & Olson, 1998). As moral philosophy has systematized 
possible prototypes of moral reasons on the level of ethical principles, people’s ethi-
cal reasoning can also be categorized by these principles. When a person says, “the 
outcome is best for everyone”, utilitarian reasoning can be identified. A Kantianist 
would prefer to say “it’s our duty to act like this”, where the particularist says “in my 
particular situation I have to do this”. Even the self is perceived as a value base and 
a moral good in modern Western societies (Baumeister, 1989). In consequence, he-
donistic reasons are perceived as legitimate (“I just like to consume this”) and have 
been elaborated in moral philosophy (Stirner, 1995). Therefore, it is possible that all 
moral or justifying arguments belong to the area of ethical reasoning and can be 
identified as examples or blends of prototypical ethical principles. However, the 
question as to what determines the lay person’s choice among ethical principles in 
reasoning remains open and will be addressed in this study.  
 
Conceptually, the principles people refer to in the process of ethical reasoning can 
be related to the individual’s personality, the social situation or both. 1) According to 
Rohan (2000), ethical principles appear in everyday life in the form of individually 
represented value-laden constructs which he called ideologies. Ideologies vary 
across social groups and personalities. 2) From the perspective of classical social 
psychology (e.g., Asch, 1955; Milgram, 1963), the preference for an ethical principle 
should be determined by the social situation. 3) The third option – the scenario ap-
plied in this study – is a blending of influences from both the persons involved and 
the situation at hand. While only preliminary attempts have been made to address 
these questions empirically (Witte & Doll, 1995; Gollan & Witte, 2008), there exists a 
good deal of psychological research on value preferences (Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992, 2011) and some independent work on the assessment of the usage 
of ethical principles (Fraedrich, & Ferrell, 1992; Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Witte & Doll, 
1995).  
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Personal Values 
 
Values were posited by Rokeach (1973) as the primary content of an individual’s 
identity. According to Rokeach, values function as cognitive standards for individual 
actions. He contends that values are universal but are differentially esteemed. In 
addressing the structure of values, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) hypothesized universal 
conflicts in the content of values. In 1992, Schwartz documented research in 20 
countries which led to a bipolar structure of 56 rated values in two orthogonal di-
mensions of self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement and openness to change vs. 
conservation. The resulting circle of values represents the relativity of values: incom-
patible values are plotted far away from one another and similar ones are plotted in 
close proximity (Schwartz, 1992, 2011). The upper part of the value circle expresses 
self-transcendence and is made up of universalistic values and benevolence, fol-
lowed clockwise by tradition, conformity and security values (conservation), power 
and achievement (self-enhancement), hedonistic values, stimulation and self-
direction (openness to change). 
 
Figure 1: Value circle (14-Bipolar-Short-Form; Strack, 2004) 
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To assess the value preferences of individuals participating in this study, we used a 
short questionnaire with 14 bipolar rating items (Strack, 2004), utilizing the empirical 
content structure of the Schwartz value circle (see Figure 1 and Appendix 2). 
 
Situational Values 
 
Just as individuals vary in personality traits, motives or value preferences, real situa-
tions differ in certain (mostly unknown) dimensions and can be categorized into 
various classes. Gollan and Witte (2008) relate value laden situations to Heider’s 
concept of situational ought (1958). We further assume that the content structure of 
values that Schwartz (1992) found in the variance between individuals can also be 
applied to the variance between situations. For example, the experiments in early 
social psychology can be interpreted as powerful demonstrations of value-laden 
situations: Conformity presses (Asch, 1955) and compliance demands (Milgram, 
1963) lead to actions of conformity and obedience. Conformity and obedience 
may be seen as values within the experimental situations. In some later studies, par-
ticipants were asked directly to express which values might be appropriate in differ-
ent situations (Feather, 1990; Heath, 1976). As Feather (1990) shows, strong situations 
may override the effects of individual value differences. Action in accordance with 
situational values, activated by vignettes, usually induce less regret than a mismatch 
of personal and situation values (second study in Lönnqvist et al., 2006). However, as 
situational values and the approach of interactionism have been given little atten-
tion in psychological value research, we will state our hypotheses on personal values 
and situational values separately.  
 
Ethical principles 
 
As Maio and Olson (1998) show, lay people normally do not reflect on their values 
and value-based decision-making in everyday life. However, when people are 
aware of conflicting values and when argumentative support is demanded by the 
situation, they are able to justify their position and to relate their values to moral rea-
sons (i.e., Maio & Olson, 1998; Tetlock, 1986). Moral philosophy, on the other hand, 
elaborates possible justifications for such value-laden actions. Philosophers claim to 
have identified all conceivable moral reasons on the level of ethical principles (Lar-
more, 1987). Therefore, while we expect that people’s own moral reasons may be 
less clearly elaborated, these reasons can nevertheless be fully described by the pro-
totypes of ethical principles clarified in moral philosophy.  
 
Within social psychology, attempts have been made to operationalize these princi-
ples. Best known is Forsyth’s (1980) taxonomy of ethical principles. Combining high or 
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low relativism with high or low idealism, he postulated four types of ideologies: situa-
tionism, absolutism, subjectivism and exceptionism. He validated his Ethics Position 
Questionnaire with individual differences from the domain of moral judgments and 
attitudes (Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2003); for example, Machia-
vellian subjects are more relativistic and less idealistic whereas subjects endorsing an 
ethic of caring are highly idealistic and non-relativistic (Forsyth et al., 1988). It is, 
however, not easy to relate the resulting categories to the ethical principles elabo-
rated in moral philosophy (Strack & Gennerich, 2007). More in line with moral phi-
losophy, Witte and Doll (1995; Gollan & Witte, 2008) proposed taxonomy of four prin-
ciples: utilitarianism, deontology, intuitionism and hedonism. The results of their study 
show that ethical positions depend on the situation (they used vignettes of posi-
tive/negative and individual, interpersonal, and social impact situations). Although 
they did not explore values, they additionally found differences between East- and 
West-German participants. Their study encourages research on the influence of per-
sonal and situational determinants of ethical principles (see the review in Gollan & 
Witte, 2008). Based on this research, we distinguish the following five principles: 
 
Utilitarianism we define with Larmore (1987) based on the principle of consequential-
ism; i.e., a person must choose that action which leads to the optimum positive out-
come for all concerned. Because this principle aims at the optimum for all, it clearly 
favors self-transcendent values. On the other hand and with reference to the value 
dimension of openness to change vs. conservation, it can lead to actions in conflict 
with tradition, because the criterion of utility is basically ahistorical. 
 
Deontology subscribes to the classical Kantian categorical imperative: “Act only 
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should be a 
universal law” (Beck, 1989). It should be emphasized that deontology primarily de-
mands that certain actions never be taken, regardless of the consequences (Lar-
more, 1987). Therefore deontology might favor conservative actions, as the range of 
justifiable actions is limited in comparison to the utilitarian principle. Fraedrich and 
colleagues (Cherry & Fraedrich, 2002; Fraedrich & Ferrel, 1992) provide some empiri-
cal evidence that deontologists are less influenced by negative consequences for 
themselves in comparison to egoists and utilitarianists, and deontological reasons 
are preferred under higher risk. As the perception of risks is related to values of con-
servation (Jost et al., 2003), we predict deontology to be related to values of tradi-
tion and security.  
 
In earlier research, partiality was discussed in practical ethical reasoning but was not 
yet recognized as a distinct basic principle. It was first introduced as such in moral 
philosophy by Larmore (1987). He defined partiality as being grounded in particular-
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istic duties evoked by personal promises and bonds. In everyday life, such bonds are 
primarily based in family relationships where universalism is restricted. Therefore, the 
principle of partiality should relate to values of security between the poles of conser-
vation and self-enhancement.  
 
Hedonism as an ethical principle was defined by Witte and Doll (1995) as being fo-
cused on personal consequences; thus, social norms should not be in conflict with 
the welfare of the individual (Parfit, 1984). This ethical orientation toward the self was 
first and less moderately elaborated by Stirner (1995), who based his theory on ego-
ism stating that other people are the objects of personal consummation. “Because 
this is best for me” is an example of a hedonistic justification. Because of the found-
ing principle of egoism, this ethical principle relates to self-enhancement values.  
 
Intuitionism was defined by Witte and Doll (1995) as the limitation of duty by emo-
tional experience, as exemplified in their intuitionism sample statement, “I simply 
have to act in this way!” Intuitionism is thus based on a person’s subjective sense of 
morality and represents their inner direction, which Riesman (1950) relates to liberal-
ism. Therefore, this principle should be primarily related to self direction values.  
 
When linking the concept of values with that of ethics, similarities between ethical 
principles and the semantics of the Schwartz (1992) value circle appear. To examine 
our assumption that ethical reasoning and values are not independent, we hy-
pothesized correlations of value orientation with the ethical principles as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (personal values hypothesis): Ethical reasoning depends on the value 
preferences of the reasoning subject. Individuals with universalistic values were pre-
dicted to prefer the utilitarian principle of consequentialism. Individuals with tradi-
tional values were predicted to prefer the principle of deontology. Persons with a 
value orientation toward security were predicted to prefer the principle of particular-
ity. Persons with self-enhancing values were predicted to prefer hedonistic justifica-
tions. Finally, the intuitionism principle should be preferred by individualist persons 
with self-direction values (i.e., openness and tolerance, see Figure 1).  
 
Hypothesis 2 (situational values hypothesis): The choice of an ethical principle de-
pends on the values demanded by the situation. The principles of utilitarianism will 
be activated in situations in which universalistic values motivate self-transcendent 
actions. Reactions to situations honouring traditional values were expected to be 
justified with deontological ethics. Situations which induce security values were ex-
pected to activate particularity, and actions based on situational self-enhancing 
values were expected to be justified with hedonistic reasoning. The choice of intu-
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itional reasoning is likely in situations promoting self direction.  
 
Therefore, we expect personal values and situational values to be specifically re-
lated to ethical principles. As stated in hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect personal val-
ues and situational values pointing to the same content to be functionally equiva-
lent (i.e. work in the same direction). The principle of functional equivalence was ini-
tially proposed by G. W. Allport (1959) to explain traits as the bases for actions and as 
the principles for perceiving different situations as equivalent opportunities to express 
the traits. The functional equivalence of personal and situational factors was elabo-
rated by Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt et al., 2003; Schmitt & Sabbagh, 2004) in 
the domain of justice research. According to them, personal and situational factors 
are functionally equivalent if they affect a given outcome similarly and are thus sub-
stitutable in their effects. Schmitt at al. (2003, 2004) further proposed that functionally 
equivalent person and situation factors amplify their effects: a synergistic interaction 
will appear.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (interaction hypothesis): If hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 both become 
accepted, then personal value preferences and situational value activation with 
content equivalence will constrain justifications in a functionally equivalent way. 
Therefore the agreement on ethical principles will additionally depend on a syner-
getic person x situation interaction. For example, within a situation that generally 
activates universalistic values (and therefore utilitarian justifications of self-
transcendent actions according to hypothesis 2), the personal value preference for 
universalistic values should effect the preference of utilitarian justifications more (with 
a higher slope) than was expected by the additive effects of the situation and the 
person alone.  
 
Method 
 
Overview and Procedure 
 
The hypotheses propose main and interaction effects of personal and situational 
values which are structured by the values circle. Personal values are usually assessed 
by abstract value statements. To maintain the completeness of the values circle also 
for the second independent variable, the situations, we decided to transfer this high 
level of abstraction to the situational values as well. Each situation was therefore de-
scribed in a vignette as an imaginary own action based on the value categories of 
the Schwartz’ values circle. After reading each of the vignettes, the participants 
were asked to rate the applicability of 10 statements that outline the five ethical 
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principles to justify his or her actions given in the vignette. Seven vignettes with sys-
tematic value content were varied within each subject.  
 
Participants 
 
Our intent was to recruit a heterogeneous non-academic sample to maximize vari-
ance in personal values and life experiences (ordinary people, so to speak). There-
fore, we asked students and acquaintances to distribute the questionnaires to peo-
ple not related to the university. 132 individuals living in Germany participated in the 
study. The return rate of the distributed questionnaires was 66%. The age of partici-
pants varied from 16 to 77 years (M = 41, SD = 17); 60% were female and 40% male; 
58% lived in the western part of Germany, and 42% in the eastern part. Twelve per-
cent of participants had a relatively low level of education (9 years), 47% a moder-
ate level (10 years), and 38% a higher level of education (12–13 years).  
 
Materials 
 
Value-laden situations. Seven vignettes (see appendix) were experimentally con-
structed to evoke abstract but value-laden situations representing the content struc-
ture of the Schwartz value circle (Figure 1). Each vignette presents an abstract social 
situation in which two values are in conflict (values at opposite sides of the circle), 
and the actor in the vignette honours one of them. The responder was invited to 
identify herself or himself with the actor in each situation and respond with her or his 
personal explanation for the adopted position. Although we were aware that par-
ticipants might find it more difficult to identify with actors in abstract situations, the 
stories were purposely kept abstract in order to assure that each situation repre-
sented a distinct value area and evoked situational demands of comparable 
“strength”. The situational vignettes seem to contain the same level of abstraction as 
is common in the assessment of personal values. Each participant worked on each 
of the seven vignettes. The fixed sequence began with the situation representing a 
universalistic position and continued with positions representing values, in a counter-
clockwise direction, in the Schwartz value circle (see Figure 1), ending with a be-
nevolence position (see appendix 1).  
 
Ethical principles. Each of the five ethical principles (deontology, utilitarianism, parti-
ality, hedonism, and intuitionism) was assessed using two statements (see appendix 
1). The ten statements were formulated according to the theoretical definitions 
given above. Each statement was rated for agreement on a five-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (rather no, rather would not use) to 5 (rather yes, rather would use). To 
control the sequence effect of the ten statements, four random sequences were 
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produced and varied between subjects. The mean of the single items range from M 
= 2.90 to 3.57 with SD from 1.00 to 1.11. In the raw data, the two-item scales show 
moderate reliabilities acceptable for the purpose of this study (Cronbach’s Alpha: 
deontology α = .67, utilitarism α = .71, partiality α = .60, hedonism α = .53 and intuition-
ism α = .67). Therefore the two statements were averaged for each principle. 
 
Personal values. The personal value preferences of the participants were assessed by 
the 14BiPole-Value questionnaire (Strack, 2004; see appendix 2). It was developed 
from a German sample of 535 respondents to the Schwartz Value Survey. The ques-
tionnaire combines 26 of the values given in the Appendix in Schwartz (1992), sup-
plemented by two new values (“Open to the world (cosmopolitan, enjoying vari-
ety)”, and “Control over uncertainty (to retain control)”) in 14 bipolar items. Partici-
pants had to decide toward which of two competing values they tended to orient 
themselves; e.g., they chose between “Equality (equal opportunity for all)” and “Au-
thority (the right to lead or command)” on a bipolar five point scale. We revealed 
the circular structure for the participants by factor analysis (PCA). The factors (43% 
item variance declared) nicely resemble the dimensions “conservation vs. openness 
to change” and “self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement” (see Figure 1). The par-
ticipants completed the 14BiPole-Value questionnaire before working on the seven 
vignettes dealing with situational values and ethical principles. 
 
Results 
 
To test the validity of the three hypotheses, we analyzed the variance of the agree-
ment scores. In the experimental 7 × 5 within subject design (seven situations, five 
ethical principles), the participants’ scores on the two dimensions of the value circle 
(the personal values) were included as covariates. The covariates were allowed to 
interact with the experimental factors. Each agreement score is therefore expressed 
by a linear equation with 12 sources of variance (see Table 1). 
 
The constant source (source 1 in Table 1) states that respondents generally agree 
with the given ethical justifications (overall mean = 3.33 on the five-point scale). The 
person main effects (sources 2 and 3 in Table 1) state that participants, who prefer 
benevolence values (conservation and self-transcendence), tend to express higher 
agreement with all given ethical justifications. The full factorial design assures the 
control over this mere leniency effect. 
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Table 1:  Experimental 7 × 5 Within-subject Design with Personal Value Preference 
(Dimensions: Self-Transcendence and Conservation, see Figure 1) as interval Predic-
tors on Agreement with five Ethical Justifications in seven Situations 
 
Source η2 df F p 
1) Constant .97 1, 122 4311.8 < .001 
 Person 
2) Self-Transcendence 
3) Conservation 
 
.08 
.02 
 
1, 122 
1, 122 
 
10.92 
3.19 
 
< .001 
.08 
4) Situation .28 6, 117 8.26 < .001 
 Person X Situation 
5) Self-Transcendence 
6) Conservation 
 
.28 
.08 
 
6, 117 
6, 117 
 
7.71 
1.84 
 
< .001 
.10 
7) Ethics .45 4, 119 24.65 < .001 
 Person X Ethics 
8) Self-Transcendence 
9) Conservation 
 
.06 
.08 
 
4, 119 
4, 119 
 
1.91 
2.58 
 
.12 
.05 
10) Situation X Ethics .45 24, 99 3.41 < .001 
 Person X Situation X Ethics    
11) Self-Transcendence 
12) Conservation 
.16 
.16 
24, 99 
24, 99 
0.78 
0.80 
.75 
.73 
 
 
The situation’s main effect (source 4 in Table 1) states that the seven situation vi-
gnettes obtain different agreement scores over all the ethical principles (effect 
scores for situations range from -0.32 to +0.19). The within-cell variance of the situa-
tion main effect correlates significantly with the participant’s values (source 5 and 6 
in Table 1) and can be interpreted as a manipulation check: a situation expressing a 
certain value area of the value circle should gain more agreement for all its justifica-
tions from participants preferring the equivalent personal values. Figure 2 illustrates 
the correlation of the participant’s values with the participant’s situation effect 
scores. 
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Figure 2: Correlation of person’s values with person’s agreement per vignette (part of 
variance due to person x situation on general agreement: sources 5 and 6 in Table 1; 
N = 132) 
  
Note: V = vignette 
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subjects with self-transcendent values and therefore are located in the upper part of 
Figure 2 (Vignettes 1 and 7, see appendix 1). The vignette in the first position of the 
questionnaire (1) did not work well – its correlation remains low. Maintaining tradi-
tions (6) is consistent related to self-transcendence values and conservation. The po-
sition dealing with well-defined social situations (5) obtained the strongest agree-
ment from participants with security values. Concern for achievement (Vignette 4) 
obtained the strongest agreement from self-enhancement persons. The values of a 
self-directed life were related more to self-enhancement than to openness to 
change but are still in the correct quadrant compared to the content structure of 
the value-circle in Figure 1. Tolerance and openness (Vignette 2) were related to 
values in the area of self-direction. The correlations depicted in Figure 2 are inter-
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preted as the value content of each situation and are used as numerical weights for 
the second hypothesis (see below).  
 
The main effect of the ethical principles (source 7 in Table 1) states that the five ethi-
cal principles gain different agreement scores (effect scores range -0.42 to +0.25, 
with the most agreement for utilitarianism and the least for deontology). The first hy-
pothesis stated that ethical reasoning depends on a participant’s value preferences. 
Figure 3 shows the correlations of the within-cell variance of the agreement with 
each of the five ethical principles (this within-cell scores can be computed for each 
subject according to the GLM procedure formulas) with the personal values (source 
8 and 9 in Table 1).  
 
Figure 3: Correlation of person’s values with person’s agreement per ethical principle 
(part of variance due to person x ethical principles: sources 8 & 9 in Table 1; N = 132) 
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As hypothesized, respondents with self-serving values prefer hedonistic reasoning, 
and subjects with traditional values prefer the principle of deontology. Subjects pro-
moting universalistic values (self-transcendence) prefer the utilitarian principle of 
reasoning and intuitionism. Only the principle of partiality did not depend on per-
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sonal values (r < .10). Overall, the dependence of ethical reasoning on personal val-
ues validates the individual differences hypothesis 1.  
 
The second hypothesis stated that the usage of ethical principles should depend on 
the values promoted by the situation. The experimental situation x ethics interaction 
in Table 1 (source 10) demonstrates the impact in question. To calculate the value 
content of the actions numerically, their correlational weights from Figure 2 were 
used. Figure 4 illustrates the correlation of agreement effect scores for each ethical 
principle per situation (source 10 in Table 1) with the value content of the situation as 
drawn from Figure 2. The exceeded magnitude of the correlations in Figure 4 is due 
to their calculation on the level of situations (N = 7). 
 
Figure 4: Correlation of situations’ values with ethical principle’s usage per situation 
(part of variance due to situation x ethics, source 10 in Table 1; N = 7 situations) 
 
 
At first glance, Figure 4 shows the expected equivalencies with the pattern in Figure 
3. Situations promoting self-transcendence values (e.g., vignette 7 of social peace, 
see Figure 2) activated the principle of utilitarianism, and situations demanding self-
enhancement values inhibit the principle of utilitarianism. Situations expressing be-
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nevolence or traditional values evoked deontological reasoning. The situational ap-
proach renders a clearer result regarding the principle of partiality, which was en-
hanced by security situations. Intuitionalism was used for self-directed actions and 
hedonistic reasoning was applied in self-enhancement situations. 
 
As the three-way interactions of personal values with the situational values’ de-
pendence on ethical principles remain insignificant (source 11 and 12 in Table 1: F < 
1, p > .70), the hypothesized synergetic interaction of person and situation was not 
found in this study. Person and situation effects remain merely additive. 
 
Discussion 
 
This investigation addressed relations between personal values, situational values 
and ethical reasoning. We applied Schwartz’s value circle (1992) and analyzed the 
dependencies of preferences for five ethical principles on personal value prefer-
ences and on value-laden situations given in experimentally specified vignettes. Per-
sonal diversity in values was fully combined with experimentally controlled situational 
values. The within-subject design ensured that an analysis of variance could regress 
agreement with ethical principles to the value content of situations, the value pref-
erence of respondents, and the interaction of both. 
 
The correlations illustrated in Figure 3 and 4 indicate that ethical principles are sub-
stantially determined by both a person’s value orientation and the value content of 
the situation. The results remain additive, no person x situation interaction emerges. 
 
By and large, the first two hypotheses were confirmed. Persons striving towards secu-
rity and tradition preferred the principle of deontology and partiality. Persons with 
value orientations of self-transcendence and openness to change preferred the 
principle of utilitarianism and intuitionism. Persons with hedonistic values preferred 
hedonistic principles. Thus, the examination of personal value systems illustrates the 
classical conflict between the utilitarian and deontological traditions (cf. Weber, 
1958). Substantial effects of the vignette contents support the second hypothesis. 
Situations promoting universalistic values evoked the principle of consequentialism 
(utilitarianism). Situations activating benevolence values were related to deonto-
logical reasoning. Situations in which actions were motivated by security tended to 
be justified with the principle of partiality. In situations emphasizing hedonistic values, 
hedonistic and intuitional reasoning was preferred.  
 
However, comparing Figures 3 and 4, some interesting differences between the ef-
fects of situational values and personal value preferences emerge, contradicting a 
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perfect functional equivalence of person and situation. This is especially obvious in 
the case of the principle of intuitionism. For both the personal and the situational 
variance sources, the relation to openness to change or self-direction maintains. In 
respect to personal values, however, the principle of intuitionism is more related to 
universalistic values, and in respect to situations it is more related to the expression of 
hedonistic values. The preference of universalists for intuitionism could be explained 
by the aptitude of people with humanistic values in self-perception and their trust in 
their own feelings (e.g., Tomkins, 1995). The common use of intuitionist reasoning after 
hedonistic actions may be explained as an acceptance of personal responsibility in 
the absence of socially justified external causes. Considering, furthermore, the addi-
tive nature of both sources, intuitionism is most prominent in justifications regarding 
self-directed hedonistic actions carried out by people with self-direction and univer-
salistic values. We therefore predict that addressees confronted with a single intu-
itionist explanation might attribute hedonistic dispositions even in the case of a uni-
versalistic orientation of the actor. Thus, our results can account for the challenges of 
emotional self-regulation and social regulation in moral arguments.  
 
The mere additive nature of our results (no person x situation interaction emerged) 
facilitates to explain social conflicts due to disagreement on ethical justifications. If 
people cannot agree on the choice between basic human values, there is little 
hope for arriving at agreement on controversial issues simply by deliberation and 
ethical discussion. According to the result of a value dependence of ethical reason-
ing, it is unlikely that party A, holding values different to party B, will perceive party 
B’s ethical principles to be convincing. The dependency of ethical reasoning on per-
sonal value systems and the resulting problems may be even stronger in real world 
behavior. In the experimental setting, the participants were forced to comply with a 
set of situational positions that might conflict with their deeper personal values. The 
ordered presentation of the situations, however, assures the smooth blending of situ-
ational values. When actions are freely chosen, they may be more in line with per-
sonal values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).  
 
The limitations of our experimentally-designed questionnaire study must also be con-
sidered. For a questionnaire study, the participant sample size is rather small and en-
ables the discussion of medium effect sizes. However, for an experimental approach 
and the effect sizes found in our data, the sample-size is quite appropriate. Addi-
tionally, the generated heterogeneity of the sample assured the variance in the per-
sonal values (see e.g., Schwartz & Rubel, 2005, in our data self-transcendence could 
be regressed on age, female sex, and education; traditional values on age and un-
employment. The personal values essentially mediated demographic effects on the 
  
Personal and situational values predict ethical reasoning 
 
434
ethical principles (Figure 3). The East-West residences of the subjects remain without 
effects. 
 
Furthermore, the merely modest reliability of the ethical principles’ measures is 
suboptimal; therefore, the stability of the length of the vectors in Figures 3 and 4 is 
unclear. They might become more reliable if more than two items were employed to 
asses each ethical principle (e.g., Witte & Doll, 1995, used five items per scale). 
Therefore, we primarily interpret the direction of the vectors. Additionally, the sam-
pling of the situations should be discussed. Limitations emerged in respect to the 
situational effects in Figure 4. Because only seven situations were presented, the cor-
relation results in Figure 4 are less reliable than the effects of personal values in Figure 
3. To obtain the same reliability of personal and situational sources, the samples of 
persons and situations would need to be of equal size. In laboratory studies, even 
smaller numbers of situations are usually varied (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2003, 2004 varied 
two situations; Lönnqvist et al., 2006, varied four). Although limited, the number of 
seven situations seems justifiable by the motivational limitations of the participants 
under demand. To ensure a sample of situations representative at least in content, 
we constructed the situation vignettes according the Schwartz value circle. We as-
sume that the value circle provides a complete representation of situations in the 
way that it represents all possible content classes of personal value orientations. For 
the sake of commensurability, we worded the situational vignettes as closely as pos-
sible to the values given in Schwartz (1992). By this means, we assured that the vi-
gnettes activated values varying systematically across all regions of the value circle. 
Hence, the abstractness of the situations corresponds to the abstractness of personal 
values. The lack of feature concreteness of the vignette situations can be seen as a 
typical limitation of a vignette study. Their abstractedness was a foreseeable conse-
quence of the value’s operationalization, and it demands an imaginative role mak-
ing on the side of the participants. Figure 2 controlled that the vignettes sufficiently 
express situational values. The overall results provide evidence that the participants 
were able to make sense of the abstract situations provided.  
 
The fact that the content of the situations represents the whole value circle addi-
tionally enables us to identify the acquiescence usually shown by subjects preferring 
conservation and self-transcendence (benevolence and tradition values). The gen-
eral linear model (GLM) is a suitable method for separating the sources of variance 
in the approach of interactionism. If the number of situations will be increased, hier-
archical linear modeling might be statistically more adequate (Raudenbush et al., 
2002).  
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When we relate the results to the discussion of moral principles within moral philoso-
phy, we see that the results support the notion of inherent conflict in the ethical uni-
verse. In the second half of the twentieth century, various authors abandoned at-
tempts to construct a unifying system which would integrate different ethical posi-
tions (Hampshire, 1983; Larmore, 1987; Nagel, 1979; Weber, 1958). This was deemed 
an irresolvable conflict between the utilitarian and the deontological traditions (e.g., 
Weber, 1958). This challenges universality in basic principles of ethical thinking and 
could undermine the if-then structure of general ethical decisions. In line with the 
theoretical analyses of ethical principles, the results suggest that the principles are 
perceived divergently, following the plurality already accepted for values (Schwartz, 
1992).  
 
However, plurality as an irresolvable coexistence of incompatible perspectives 
seems to incrementally receive acceptance only in the case of social or interper-
sonal diversity. The study therefore was restricted to the social situation of justifica-
tions in interpersonal value conflicts. Future analysis might examine intrapersonal 
value conflicts, its intrapersonal reasoning (Bernard et al., 2003a), and accompanied 
affects. In this line a bit of incertitude affect came to the fore when our subjects less 
agreed with all ethic principles applied to specific situations, respectively their imag-
ined value position in situation that did not match their personal values. This - on a 
lower level already interactionistic - variance source was used as the manipulation 
check of the vignettes in Figure 2. Justification involvement is a function of the per-
son–situation match. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The results confirm the dependence of action justification (i.e. the application of 
ethical principles) on personal and situational values. Orderly conflicts among ethi-
cal principles resulted from the plurality of values. Conflicts between ethical princi-
ples not only create problems for the development of unifying systems in philosophy 
but they also hinder the function of everyday moral reasoning, deliberation and in-
terpersonal discourse. Actions based on ethical reasoning intelligible to addressees 
with similar value orientations are easy to accept. The same justifications are difficult 
to agree on for addressees who prefer competing values or who are located in dif-
ferent situations. Based on our results, we propose employing the conscious and 
controlled use of contra-intuitive reasoning in the attempt to resolve social conflicts. 
The application of ethical principles which usually match the competing values of 
the other party might evoke better mutual understanding and respect, even if there 
is no common ground for an agreement on the values themselves. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Each of the seven vignettes was followed by the 10 statements for their justification (translations) 
 
The seven vignettes:  
(1) “You get involved in an argument. You are arguing for social justice and more integrity in order 
to protect the disadvantaged against the unjust enrichment and desire for power of the individ-
ual.”  
(2) “You get involved in an argument. You are on the side of tolerance and open-mindedness 
while the other party seeks to save face in public.” 
(3) “You get involved in an argument because you want to try out new ways instead of abandon-
ing good ideas in order not to offend older generations.” 
(4) “You get involved in an argument. You are expected to be more humble and to demonstrate 
an unrealistic romanticism for nature. You bring up the improvement of standards of living and are 
able to come to agreement on modern technical achievements.” 
(5) “You get involved in an argument where the other party overemphasizes egalitarianism for 
and openness towards all and everybody. You took your authority and serve up clear circum-
stances.” 
(6) “You get involved in an argument. The other party is willing to accept irresponsible risks while 
seeking short-term gain. You argue for the conservation of approved traditions.“ 
(7) “You get involved in an argument because you assert your position for stability and a peaceful 
society whereas the other party only seeks advantages for themselves. Which of the following 
justifications would you choose?”   
 
The statements for justification (ethical principles) to be assessed on a five-point rating scale (1 
rather no to 5 rather yes) 
(deontological) 
“It is my duty towards society to do so.” 
“My guidelines are the principles of universal validity” 
(utilitarian) 
“It is clear that in the long run it is the best for everyone.” 
“Looking at the overall consequences, this is the better choice for all concerned.”  
(particular) 
“I feel personally committed and must take a stand.”  
“In my situation I’m committed to this behavior.” 
(intuitional) 
“Intuitively I feel this position is the right one.”  
“I simply have to act in this way.”  
(hedonistic) 
“This is best for me.” 
“Everyone has a right to hold this position.” 
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Appendix 2: The 14BiPole-Value questionnaire 
 
Instructions: The following 14 value pairs are not necessarily opposites; they may express comple-
mentary tendencies under some circumstances. Please indicate your own personal values. Rating 
a value with an answer of „2“ indicates „clearly more important than the other value“, an answer 
of  „1“ indicates „tends to be preferred over the other“ and „0“ indicates equal weight for both 
values. Please make only one mark in each row.  
EQUALITY 
(equal opportunity for all) 
2 1 0 1 2 
AUTHORITY 
(the right to lead or 
command) 
SOCIAL POWER 
(control over others, 
dominance) 
2 1 0 1 2 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(correcting injustices, 
care for the weak) 
SOCIAL ORDER 
(stability of society) 
2 1 0 1 2 
EXCITING LIFE 
(stimulating experiences) 
WEALTH 
(material possessions, 
money) 
2 1 0 1 2 
UNITY WITH NATURE 
(fitting into nature) 
POLITENESS 
(courtesy, good manners) 
2 1 0 1 2 
CREATIVITY 
(uniqueness, imagination) 
ENJOYING LIFE 
(fulfilment of wishes) 
2 1 0 1 2 
A WORLD AT PEACE 
(free of war and conflict) 
BROAD-MINDED 
(tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
2 1 0 1 2 
PRESERVING PUBLIC IMAGE 
(protecting face) 
HUMBLE 
(modest, self-effacing) 
2 1 0 1 2 
INFLUENCIAL 
(having an impact on people  
and events) 
HONEST 
(genuine, sincere) 
2 1 0 1 2 
SUCCESSFUL 
(achieving goals) 
ENJOYING LIFE 
(enjoying food, sex, leisure, 
etc.) 
2 1 0 1 2 
DEVOUT 
(holding to religious faith and 
belief) 
RESPECT FOR TRADITION 
(preservation of time-honoured 
customs) 
2 1 0 1 2 
A VARIED LIFE 
(filled with challenge, 
novelty, and change) 
DARING 
(seeking adventure, risk) 
2 1 0 1 2 
OBEDIENT 
(dutiful, meeting obligations) 
CHOOSING OWN GOALS 
(selecting own purposes) 
2 1 0 1 2 
HONORING OF PARENTS AND 
ELDERS (showing respect) 
OPENNESS 
(cosmopolitan orientation, 
advocate of diversity) 
2 1 0 1 2 
CONTROL OVER UNCERTAINTY 
(control over events 
and their development) 
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